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REVEALING GENDER-SPECIFIC COSTS OF STEM IN AN
EXTENDED ROY MODEL OF MAJOR CHOICE
MARC HENRY, ROMUALD ME´ANGO, AND ISMAE¨L MOURIFIE´
Abstract. We derive sharp bounds on the non consumption utility component in an
extended Roy model of sector selection. We interpret this non consumption utility compo-
nent as a compensating wage differential. The bounds are derived under the assumption
that potential wages in each sector are (jointly) stochastically monotone with respect to an
observed selection shifter. The lower bound can also be interpreted as the minimum cost
subsidy necessary to change sector choices and make them observationally indistinguish-
able from choices made under the classical Roy model of sorting on potential wages only.
The research is motivated by the analysis of women’s choice of university major and their
underrepresentation in mathematics intensive fields. With data from a German graduate
survey, and using the proportion of women on the STEM faculty at the time of major
choice as our selection shifter, we find high costs of choosing the STEM sector for women
from the former West Germany, especially for low realized incomes and low proportion of
women on the STEM faculty, interpreted as a scarce presence of role models.
Keywords: Roy model, partial identification, stochastic monotonicity, women in STEM.
JEL subject classification: C31, C34, I21, J24
introduction
The underrepresentation of women in mathematics intensive education and occupa-
tions is of concern to academics and policy makers, especially since it is perceived as
one of the main drivers of the gender wage gap (see Daymont and Andrisani [1984], Zafar
[2013] and Sloane et al. [2019]). A survey of the scholarship on the issue can be found in
Kahn and Ginther [2017]. We examine the issue from the point of view of college major
choice. The literature on major choice, reviewed in Altonji et al. [2016], emphasizes the
importance of factors beyond expected earnings in the determination of major choice: see
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Delavande and Zafar [2019] and Arcidiacono et al. [2019] on the role of non pecuniary fac-
tors and outcomes, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2018], Wiswal and Zafar [2015, 2018] on
the importance of job amenities, Cunha et al. [2005], Eisenhauer et al. [2015a] on the impor-
tance of psychic costs. Mas and Pallais [2017], Wiswal and Zafar [2018] and Mourifie´ et al.
[2020] find gender specific response to non pecuniary factors in the valuation and choice
of occupations. This motivates the current theoretical analysis of (partial) identification
of gender-specific non pecuniary drivers of major choice within what is generally known in
the literature as the extended Roy model (see Heckman and Vytlacil [1999] for details on
model genealogy and attribution).
Bayer et al. [2011], d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013] and Eisenhauer et al. [2015b] ana-
lyze the extended Roy model and provide competing strategies to identify the non pecuniary
driver of choice under separability, support assumptions and exclusion restrictions. Saltiel
[2018] looks specifically at women’s college major choice through the lens of a multi-stage
extended Roy model inspired by Heckman et al. [2016, 2018]. We eschew such identify-
ing assumptions and derive sharp bounds on the non pecuniary driver of choice based on
minimal assumptions. The model allows for multiple interpretations of the non pecuniary
component, including anticipated lack of support for women in mathematics intensive edu-
cation and occupations, mathematics talent misperception, as well as gender stereotyping
of occupations.
The primitives of the model are potential labor market outcomes (Y0, Y1), such as wages,
in both sectors 0 (non mathematics intensive college major) and 1 (mathematics intensive
college major). From now on, Sector 1 will be referred to as the STEM sector, and Sector 0
as the non STEM sector, where STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics. The realized outcome Y is equal to the potential outcome in the selected
sector, so that Y = Y1D + Y0(1 − D), where D is the observed random sector selection
indicator. In the classical Roy model, Y = max{Y0, Y1}. In the extended Roy model we
consider, choices are affected by potential outcomes and a vector of observable variables W .
Individuals choose Sector 1 when Y1−C(Y1,W ) > Y0, and Sector 0 when Y1−C(Y1,W ) < Y0,
where C is a relative cost of choosing Sector 1 relative to Sector 0. Since we are looking
at reasons women are driven away from STEM majors, we will restrict the relative cost
function C to be non negative.
In allowing for the non pecuniary cost function C to depend on potential outcome Y1, we
depart from previous work on the identification of extended Roy models, such as Bayer et al.
[2011] and d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013]. Our specification can be rationalized by the
maximization of utilities that may not be quasi-linear. Hence, we allow the marginal rate of
substitution between amenities and income to be a function of the latter. In the context of
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labor sector choice, we expect the marginal rate of substitution between wage and a female
friendly environment to vary according to the skill requirements of the job, hence the wage.
The objective of this analysis is to characterize the collection of cost functions that
rationalize observed choices. We will refer to this set as the identified set. We interpret the
non pecuniary cost function as a wage differential that compensates for the real or perceived
disamenities of the STEM sector for women. Hence the identified set characterizes our
ability to draw inference on compensating wage differentials in this context. An alternative
interpretation of the lower bound of the identified set, which we derive in closed form, is as
the minimum subsidy for Sector 1 to make choices observationally indistinguishable from
choices that conform to the classical Roy model of sector selection based only on potential
outcomes.
Without additional constraints on the model environment, zero cost can always rational-
ize choices, since potential outcomes Y0 = Y1 := Y could have given rise to the observed
data. Hence, the identified set is of little use in this case. We therefore assume that a
subvector Z of the observable variables W = (X,Z) can only affect potential outcomes and
selection relevant costs in one direction. Hence Z is a vector of observable variables that
have a monotonic effect on potential outcomes in the following sense: the joint distribution
of (Y0, Y1) conditional on X = x,Z = z is (weakly) increasing in first order stochastic
dominance when z increases (in the componentwise order) for all x. This condition is a gen-
eralization of the Manski and Pepper [2000] monotone instrumental variable assumption,
and is also related to the stochastic monotonicity constraint in Blundell et al. [2007]. For
ease of notation, we will fix X = x for the whole analysis and omit it from notation. How-
ever, it is important to remember that the cost function C can be a function of individual
and sector characteristics contained in X. In particular, we expect it to depend on gender.
In addition, the stochastic monotonicity assumption is expected to hold conditionally on
individual and sector characteristics contained in X, particularly gender.
Combining stochastic monotonicity of potential outcomes with monotonicity of the cost
function provides a set of sufficient conditions for our assumption. We argue that factors
that positively impact the formation of cognitive and non cognitive skills, while reducing
perceived costs of the STEM sector, are likely to satisfy this set of sufficient conditions.
Maternal educational attainment and the proportion of female role models (faculty, alumni,
invited speakers) are prime candidates (see Breda et al. [2018] and Riegle-Crumb and Moore
[2014]).
Under the stochastic monotonicity constraint, we derive a characterization of the set
of cost functions that rationalize the data using moment inequalities. We also derive the
bounds of this set of cost functions in closed form. To derive the lower bound, we use the
lower monotone envelope of realized outcomes, a notion related to but distinct from the
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monotonization of Chernozhukov et al. [2009]. We then derive testable implications of the
model. We also provide similar results for an extension of the model where individuals base
their decisions on their expectations of potential outcomes at the time of sector choice. Fi-
nally, we derive bounds on the distribution of non pecuniary costs in a generalized version of
the model, where these costs may depend on unobservable characteristics of the individuals,
beyond their potential outcomes.
Mourifie´ et al. [2020] document rejection of the Roy model of sorting on labor market
outcomes for women in the sample of German graduates in the 2005 and 2009 graduating
cohorts of the German DZHW Graduate Survey (see Baillet et al. [2017]). We therefore
analyze women’s choice of major within the framework of our extended Roy model and
derive confidence regions for the minimum cost of STEM that rationalize choices. The
substantive assumptions we make are that the proportion of women on the STEM faculty in
the individual’s region at the time of major choice (as a proxy for the presence of role models
and better amenities for women) only affects potential labor market outcomes of women
graduates positively. We find very significant costs of choosing STEM fields for German
women from the former Federal Republic. We observe that among the 2009 graduation
cohort, 2 out of 10 have minimum cost of STEM larger than 20% of their income, and 1
out of 10 have minimum cost larger than 40% of their income. The costs are particularly
pronounced for women in the lower quartile of the income distribution and for women whose
region had low rates of feminization of the STEM faculty at the time of major choice.
Outline. The next section presents the extended Roy model and the main identification
results. Section 2 discusses structural underpinning of the model. Section 3 presents exten-
sions to imperfect foresight and the generalized Roy model. Section 4 applies the methodol-
ogy to women’s major choices in Germany. The last section concludes. Proofs of the main
results are collected in the appendix.
1. analytical framework
1.1. Extended Roy Model of Major Choice. We adopt the framework of the potential
outcomes model Y = Y1D + Y0(1 −D). Y , with support Y ⊆ [b,∞), is an observed scalar
outcome (with b ∈ R and b = 0 in most cases of interest), D is an observed selection
indicator, which takes value 1 if Sector 1 is chosen, and 0 if Sector 0 is chosen, and Y1,
Y0, are unobserved potential outcomes. In the context of major choice, the outcome of
interest will be income in the year following graduation. Sector 1 will consist of all STEM
majors and Sector 0, the rest. Decision makers choose their sector of activity based on the
realizations of Y0 and Y1, and a vector of observed exogenous characteristics Z with support
Z ⊆ Rdz . In the context of women’s major choice, the vector Z will be either Z = (Z0, Z1)
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or simply Z = Z1, where Zd is the proportion of women on the faculty in Sector d in
the individual’s region or prospective university at the time of choice. Additional observed
exogenous covariates will be omitted from the notation. In the context of major choice in
Germany, these include gender, visible minority status and a dummy for residence in the
former East Germany, as a less affluent region.
Since Y, D and Z are observed, the distribution pi of (Y,D,Z) is directly identified from
the data. We call Π the set of admissible data generating processes. Unless otherwise
specified, Π is the set of probability distributions on Y × {0, 1} × Z. We summarize the
model with the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Potential outcomes). Observed outcomes are the realizations of a random
variable Y satisfying Y = Y1D + Y0(1 −D), where (Y0, Y1) is a pair of possibly dependent
unobserved random variables with support Y ⊆ [b,∞), and D is an observed indicator
variable.
The original Roy model posits sector selection based only on the comparison of potential
outcomes, so that Y = max{Y0, Y1}. Given our focus on the underrepresentation of women
in STEM fields, and rejections of the original Roy model selection rule in Mourifie´ et al.
[2020], we entertain the possibility that other factors affect sector selection in favor of the non
STEM sector. In the context of women’s major choices, C might be a gender-specific cost
of studying in a STEM field or a gender-specific cost of working in the STEM sector. The
former may be the result of the lack of support for female students, or a fear of mathematics
carried over from schooling (see Xie et al. [2015] for a survey of the sociological literature
on the subject). The latter may be related to family-friendliness of employment outside
STEM.
Hence, in our model, the decision by the individual is based on the comparison between
Y1 − C and Y0, where Y1 is the potential outcome (wage) in the STEM sector and C is an
unobserved possibly non pecuniary cost of STEM studies and professional activities.
Assumption 2 (Selection). The selection indicator satisfies Y1 −C(Y1, Z) > Y0 ⇒ D = 1,
Y1−C(Y1, Z) < Y0 ⇒ D = 0, where C is a measurable function on Y×Z and y 7→ y−C(y, z)
is invertible for all z ∈ Z.
We focus on the case, where cost C is a function of the potential outcome Y1 and another
vector of observable variables Z (observable in both sectors), but we later also discuss the
case, where the cost may depend on other unobservables as well. The dependence of the
cost function on potential outcomes distinguishes the assumption below from other extended
Roy models cited above. As we show in Section 2 in the discussion of the selection rule’s
possible structural underpinnings, it allows us to go beyond the comparison of quasi-linear
utilities.
6 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD ME´ANGO, AND ISMAE¨L MOURIFIE´
We expect the costs incurred by women studying or working in the mathematics intensive
sector to be less pronounced for women with higher mathematics ability, hence decreasing
in Y1. In the following, we consider the weaker assumption that the rate of increase of such
costs with Y1 be less than 1.
Assumption 3 (Shape).
(1) The function y 7→ y − C(y, z) is increasing for each z ∈ Z.
(2) The function C is non negative.
(3) The function z 7→ C(y, z) is non increasing (in the componentwise ordering) for
each y ∈ Y.
In the following, Assumption 3(2) will be maintained throughout. Assumption 3(3) will
only appear in a set of sufficient conditions for Assumption 4 in Lemma 1 of Section 1.2.
1.2. Stochastically Monotone Instrumental Variables. Without further restrictions,
the trivial choice C = 0 would rationalize any data generating process under Assumptions 1
and 2. Indeed, for any given random vector (Y,D) generating observations, the choices
Y0 = Y1 := Y and C = 0 trivially satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. To restore testability,
we introduce a shape restriction on the joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1).
A traditional approach to restoring testability without parametric restrictions is to allow
some observed covariates to affect sector selection only. However, such restrictions are
difficult to justify in the context of college major choice. Parental educational attainment
is likely to be correlated with unobserved parental cognitive and non cognitive investments
in their children (see Card [2001]). Distance to college and other instruments designed to
affect educational attainment choices are not suitable for major choice. Other variables
that are very relevant to a woman’s major choice, such as the proportion of women on
the faculty, are expected to affect potential outcomes for women as well as their choices.
We resort instead to a weaker instrumental notion, where the instrument Z may affect the
joint distribution of potential outcomes, but only in one direction, in terms of first order
stochastic ordering. For more details on the multivariate first order stochastic ordering,
refer to Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007], Section 6.B.1. When comparing vectors, “≥”
denotes the componentwise partial order.
Definition 1 (First Order Stochastic Dominance). A distribution F1 on R
k is said to be
first order stochastically dominated by a distribution F2 if there exists random vectors X1
with distribution F1 and X2 with distribution F2 such that X2 ≥ X1. By extension, a
random vector with distribution F2 is also said to stochastically dominate a random vector
with distribution F1.
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Replacing traditional exclusion and independence restrictions with a monotonicity re-
striction allows us to restore testability of the Roy model with variables such as parental
educational attainment and the proportion of women on the faculty. These variables are
likely to affect potential outcomes as well as choices. However, it can be argued that the
effect on potential outcomes can only be positive, as additional unobserved parental invest-
ment and additional support and role models for women in STEM are not expected to have
a negative effect on their future labor market prospects. The mathematical formalization
of this monotonicity notion is stochastic monotonicity.
Definition 2 (Stochastic Monotonicity). A random vector X on Rk is said to be stochasti-
cally monotone (non decreasing) with respect to a random vector Z on Rl if the conditional
distribution of X given Z = z1 is first order stochastically dominated by the conditional
distribution of X given Z = z2, for any pair (z1, z2) of elements of the support of Z such
that z2 ≥ z1.
Using Definition 2, we can now formally state our instrumental constraint, we call stochas-
tically monotone instrumental variable constraint, hereafter SMIV.
Assumption 4 (SMIV). The random vector (Y0, Y1−C(Y1, Z)) is stochastically monoton-
ically non decreasing with respect to Z.
A simple implication of Assumption 4 is the following.
Assumption 4′. The random vector (Y0, Y1 − C(Y1, Z)) is such that for each y, P(Y0 ≤
y, Y1 − C(Y1, Z) ≤ y|Z = z) is monotonically non increasing in z.
Sufficient conditions include the case, where the vector of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) is
stochastically monotone with respect to Z, and the cost function is decreasing in z. In
the context of women’s major choice, where the costs are associated with lack of support
for female students in STEM fields, we expect such costs to decrease with the presence of
female faculty and role models in STEM fields and in the educational level of the student’s
mother, hence the assumption that such costs are decreasing when the values of the chosen
sector selection variables Z increase. This is not necessary for Assumption 4, but combined
with the assumption that more female faculty or a higher educational attainment of the
mother cannot hurt a woman’s prospects, it yields the following set of sufficient conditions
for Assumption 4.
Lemma 1 (Sufficient conditions). If Assumptions 3(1) and 3(3) hold and (Y0, Y1) is stochas-
tically monotone non decreasing with respect to Z, then Assumption 4 (SMIV) holds.
The sufficient conditions of Lemma 1 includes the SMIV assumption in Mourifie´ et al.
[2020], which is inspired by the monotone instrumental variable (MIV) of Manski and Pepper
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[2000]. Unlike MIV, it places restrictions on the joint distribution of potential outcomes,
as opposed to the marginals only, and drives our characterization of the model’s empirical
content in Theorem 1. Section 2 discusses structural underpinning for the selection and the
shape assumptions.
1.3. Characterization of the Cost Function. The object of inference is the hidden cost
function C. In particular, we seek a minimal function C that rationalizes the data under
the extended Roy model of Assumptions 1-4. From a policy point of view in the context of
women’s major choice, this minimal cost function can be interpreted as the smallest subsidy
necessary to offset the psychological costs from lack of support or fear of mathematics, or
offset the lack of support for child-care in the STEM sector, and restore efficiency, i.e.
restore choices that are observationally indistinguishable from choices based on the pure
Roy model, where the sector is selected to maximize potential outcomes.
1.3.1. Identified Set. Before turning to the identification of the minimal cost function, we
characterize the set of all cost functions that can rationalize the data under Assumptions 1,
2, 3(2) and 4. This will be the content of Theorem 1. We start with a formal definition of
the set of cost functions that rationalize the data under the model assumptions.
Definition 3 (Identified Set). For any pi ∈ Π, we call C(pi) the collection of functions
C : Y ×Z → R+, such that there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1,D,Z) where ((1−D)Y0+
DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumptions 1, 2, 3(2) and 4 are satisfied.
We are interested in characterizing the identified set C(pi) with moment inequalities, and
conducting inference on an element C in C(pi), which will be interpreted as the minimal cost
function that can rationalize observations within the extended Roy model (Assumptions 1,
2, 3(2) and 4).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, when D = 1, Y − DC(Y,Z) = Y1 − C(Y1, Z) ≥ Y0, and
when D = 0, Y −DC(Y,Z) = Y0 ≥ Y1 − C(Y1, Z). Hence we have
Y −DC(Y,Z) = max{Y0, Y1 − C(Y1, Z)}. (1.1)
Hence, Assumptions 1, 2, 3(2) and 4 imply stochastic monotonicity of Y −DC(Y,Z) with
respect to Z, which can be expressed as a collection of moment inequalities involving the
infinite dimensional parameter C. Conversely, stochastic monotonicity of Y − DC(Y,Z)
with respect to Z is shown to imply that C can rationalize the data, i.e., that we can
construct a vector of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) such that Assumptions 1, 2, 3(2) and 4
are satisfied. This discussion is formalized in the next theorem (proved in the appendix).
Theorem 1 (Characterization). For any pi ∈ Π, the identified set C(pi) is equal to the set of
non negative measurable functions C on Y × Z such that P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≥ b|Z = z) = 1
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for each z, and for any (Y,D,Z) with distribution pi, and all pairs z ≥ z˜ of elements of Z,
inf
y∈Y
[P(Y −DC(Y,Z) > y|Z = z)− P(Y −DC(Y,Z) > y|Z = z˜)] ≥ 0. (1.2)
A notable aspect of the characterization in Theorem 1 is that it shows observational equiv-
alence of Assumption 4 and the much weaker Assumption 4′. More precisely, for any pi ∈ Π,
and any function C : Y × Z → R+, such that there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1,D,Z)
where ((1−D)Y0+DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi, if Assumption 1, 2, Assumption 3(2) and
the weaker Assumption 4′ are satisfied, then (1.2) holds, so that any inference based on
(1.2) is valid under the weaker instrumental restriction in Assumption 4′. Conversely, if pi
satisfies (1.2) for some function C, then there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1,D,Z) where
((1 − D)Y0 + DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumption 1, 2, 3(2) and the stronger
Assumption 4 are satisfied.
1.3.2. Closed form bounds on the cost function. To complement the characterization of the
identified set in Theorem 1, we derive bounds C and C¯ on costs functions in the identified
set C(pi). Under an additional shape restriction, we further show that the bound C belongs
to the identified set C(pi), so that it is an achievable sharp bound.
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3(2), Y ≥ Y −DC(Y,Z) = max{Y0, Y1 − C(Y1, Z)} ≥ Y0.
Hence, for each y ∈ Y, we have
P(Y ≤ y|z) ≤ P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤ y|z) ≤ P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) + P(D = 1|z)1{y ≥ b},
where the last inequality uses standard worst-case bounds for the distribution of potential
outcome Y0. Now, under Assumption 4
′ (hence, also under Assumption 4, which is stronger),
the middle term is monotone non increasing in z for each y, and is right-continuous as a
function of y. Hence, defining
F (y|z) := lim
y˜↓y
sup {P(Y ≤ y˜|z˜) : z˜ ∈ Z, z˜ ≥ z} ,
F¯ (y|z) := lim
y˜↓y
inf {P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z˜) + P(D = 1|z˜)1{y ≥ b} : z˜ ∈ Z, z˜ ≤ z} ,
(1.3)
we have
F (y|z) ≤ P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤ y|z) ≤ F¯ (y|z), (1.4)
for all (y, z), whenever Assumptions 1, 2, 3(2) and 4′ hold. This yields the testable implica-
tion for our model that bounds F (y|z) and F¯ (y|z) cannot cross. Since P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤
y|z) = P(Y −C(Y,Z) ≤ y,D = 1|z)+P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z), and since P(Y −C(Y,Z) ≤ y,D =
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1|z) is non decreasing in y, (1.4) also yields the bounds
L(y|z) := sup
y˜≤y
{F (y˜|z)− P(Y ≤ y˜,D = 0|z)}
≤ P(Y − C(Y,Z) ≤ y,D = 1|z)
≤ inf
y≤y˜
{
F¯ (y˜|z)− P(Y ≤ y˜,D = 0|z)
}
:= U(y|z).
(1.5)
Finally, we have the following lemma, establishing bounds on the cost functions in the
identified set of Definition 3.
Corollary 1 (Bounds on the Cost Function). All cost functions C in the identified set C(pi)
of Definition 3 satisfy for all (y, z) ∈ Y × Z:
C(y, z) := y − L− (F1(y|z)|z) ≤ C(y, z) ≤ y − U
− (F1(y|z)|z) := C¯(y, z),
where F1(y|z) := P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|Z = z) and U
− and L−, defined respectively by U
−(x) :=
inf{y : U(y) ≥ x} and L−(x) := sup{y : L(y) ≤ x}, are generalized inverses of U and L
from (1.5).
To prove that the lower bound of Corollary 1 is attained (hence is sharp), we need to
verify that F (·|z) is a well defined cdf for all z, and hence is suitable candidate for the
distribution function of Y − DC(Y,Z). This is shown in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. We
also need the following shape and regularity assumptions.
Assumption 5. The functions F1(·|z) defined in Corollary 1 and F (·|z) − P(Y ≤ ·,D =
0|z), where F is defined in (1.3) are continuous and increasing for all z ∈ Z. The function C
defined in Corollary 1 is continuous in y for all z ∈ Z.
Corollary 2 (Sharpness). Under Assumption 5, the bound C of Corollary 1 is an element
of the identified set C(pi). Hence it is an achievable sharp bound.
The closed form solutions for the bounds on the identified set provides a simpler basis for
inference than the characterization of Theorem 1, which relies on a continuum of moment
inequalities. Inference on C and C¯ will be discussed in Section 4.3.
2. Structural underpinnings of the selection equation
Structural underpinnings for the selection rule of Assumption 2 are now discussed. It
can be interpreted as a transformation of a decision rule based on relative utilities in both
sectors. Suppose individuals choose the sector based on the comparison between utility in
Sector 1, u1(Y1, Z), and utility in Sector 0, u0(Y0, Z), with u0 and u1 satisfying the following
traditional shape and regularity conditions.
Assumption 6 (Utility model). For d = 0, 1, Sector d utility ud : Y × Z 7→ R satisfies:
GENDER-SPECIFIC COSTS IN EXTENDED ROY MODEL 11
(1) Utility ud is continuously differentiable and y 7→ ud(y, z) is increasing with range R
for each z ∈ Z and for d = 0, 1.
(2) For each (y, z) ∈ Y × Z, u0(y, z) ≥ u1(y, z).
(3) For each (y, z) ∈ Y × Z, and d = 0, 1, ∇zu0(u
−1
0 (u1(y, z), z), z) ≤ ∇zu1(y, z).
Sector specific utility ud can be rationalized by different amenities. Take Z = (Z0, Z1)
for instance, where Zd is the proportion of women on the faculty in Sector d. Women
applicants may prefer Sector 0 because the proportion of women in the faculty is larger,
hence u0(y, z) = u(y, z0) > u(y, z1) = u1(y, z). In this latter case, where ud(y, z) = u(y, zd),
d = 0, 1, we say that the instrument is sector specific.
Sector specific utility may also be rationalized with reference dependence (Thaler [1980]
and Tversky and Kahneman [1991]) based on gender profiling: social conditioning makes
women prefer Sector 0. In the case a vector of instruments Z can potentially affect both
sector specific utilities, the mother’s educational attainment being one example, Assump-
tion 6(3) holds if Assumption 6(2) does, ∇zu1(y, z) ≥ ∇zu0(y, z) and∇z (∂u1(y, z)/∂y) ≥ 0.
Assumptions 2 and 3 can be recovered from sector specific utilities in the following way.
Proposition 1 (Utility Model). Under Assumption 6(1), if ud(Yd, Z) > u1−d(Y1−d, Z)
implies D = d, for d = 0, 1, then Assumptions 2 and 3(1) hold with C(y, z) := y −
u−10 (u1(y, z), z), where the inverse of u0 is taken relative to the first argument. In addition,
we have the following.
(1) If in addition, Assumption 6(2) holds, then Assumption 3(2) holds.
(2) If in addition, Assumption 6(3) holds, then Assumption 3(3) holds.
Example 1 (Quasi-linear utilities). In the special case ud(y, z) = y + gd(z), for some
function gd, d = 0, 1, the cost function becomes C(y, z) = g0(z) − g1(z). Assumption 3
holds when g0(z)−g1(z) is non negative and non increasing in z. In the context of women’s
major choice, this is satisfied, for instance, if the proportion of female faculty has no effect
on utility from non STEM majors, so that g0(z) = 0, and has an increasing positive effect
on utility from STEM majors, so that g1 is increasing in z.
Note that in Example 1 above, the cost function C(y, z) = g0(z) − g1(z) is a function
of z only, as in the extended Roy models analyzed in the literature (see Bayer et al. [2011]
and d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013]). More generally, the cost function C(y, z) = y −
u−10 (u1(y, z), z) based on the utility model of Assumption 6 depends on potential outcomes
unless the constraint ∂u1(y, z)/∂y = ∂u0(u
−1
0 (u1(y, z), z)z)/∂y holds.
When the selection rule of Assumption 2 is derived from utility maximization, the cost
function C can be interpreted as a compensating wage differential. Suppose women perceive
inferior amenities in the STEM sector. Call (y, z) 7→ C˜(y, z) the compensating differential
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defined by u1(y, z) = u0(y − C˜, z). Then C˜(y, z) = y − u
−1
0 (u1(y, z), z) = C(y, z). Hence,
C(y, z) in Assumption 2 is a monetary adjustment that makes women, whose talents entitle
them to identical (uncompensated) wages in both sectors, indifferent between the two sec-
tors. As defined, it is a willingness to pay for the better amenities of the non-STEM sector,
or equivalently, the equivalent variation to move from non-STEM to STEM. Defining the
model symmetrically would allow us to partially identify willingness to accept compensation
and compensating variation as well. Note, however, that the identified set would then be
different from the one we derive for willingness to pay and equivalent variation.
3. extensions: imperfect foresight and generalized roy model
3.1. Imperfect Foresight. In order to analyze the sensitivity of our results to the assump-
tion that individuals make sector choices with perfect knowledge of their future earnings
in each sector, we also consider a variation of the model, called imperfect foresight, where
choices are made using expectations based on the decision maker’s information set I at the
time of decision. We assume throughout this section that the instrument Z is I-measurable,
since it is a vector of variables easily observable at the time of choice. In the context of
major choice, the information set involves some knowledge of individual talent for math-
ematics and non mathematics intensive activities, as well as some anticipation of future
labor market conditions and the prices of talent.
Assumption 7 (Imperfect Foresight). The selection indicator D satisfies
E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I] > E[Y0|I]⇒ D = 1 and E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I] < E[Y0|I]⇒ D = 0,
where the conditional expectations are well defined, I is the sigma-algebra characterizing
the agent’s information set at the time of sector choice, Z is I-measurable, and C is a
non negative measurable function on Y × Z, such that y 7→ y − C(y, z) is continuous and
increasing in y for each z ∈ Z.
As in the case of perfect foresight, we derive a crucial implication of Assumptions 1 and 7.
Under Assumptions 1 and 7, when D = 1, E[Y − DC(Y,Z)|I] = E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I] ≥
E[Y0|I], and when D = 0, E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|I] = E[Y0|I] ≥ E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I]. Hence we
have
E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|I] = max{E[Y0|I],E[Y1 −C(Y1, Z)|I]}. (3.1)
This relation is the key to deriving testable implications of restrictions on the joint distribu-
tion of potential outcomes. This relation also provides a direct proof of the identification of
the cost function under the assumptions of d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013], as described
in Appendix C.
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The imperfect foresight version of the Assumption 4 is the following:
Assumption 8 (Imperfect Foresight Monotonicity). The random vector (E[Y0|I],E[Y1 −
C(Y1, Z)|I]) is stochastically monotone non decreasing with respect to Z.
We now discuss some sufficient conditions for Assumption 8. Writing E[Yd−dC(Y1, Z)|I] =
E[Yd − dC(Y1, Z)|Z] + Vd, for d ∈ {0, 1}, the case (V0, V1) ⊥ Z, coupled with monotonicity
in z of E[Yd − dC(Y1, Z)|Z = z], for d ∈ {0, 1}, is a special case of Assumption 8. Another
set of sufficient conditions mirrors Lemma 1: Assumption 8 holds if the cost function C is
only a function of z and is non increasing in z, and the random vector (E[Y0|I],E[Y1|I])
is stochastically monotone with respect to Z. For example, in the isoelastic utility case in
Appendix B, if µd(z) is a non decreasing function of z, then (E[Y0|I],E[Y1|I]) is stochasti-
cally monotone with respect to Z. Moreover, if σ21(z) − σ
2
0(z) is a non increasing function
of z, then C is a non increasing function of z. Hence Assumption 7 holds.
As in the perfect foresight case, a simple implication of Assumption 8 is the following.
Assumption 8′. The random variable max{E[Y0|I],E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I]} is stochastically
monotone non decreasing with respect to Z.
Consider Assumptions 7 and 8 instead of Assumptions 2 and 4. As before, the object
of inference is the hidden cost function C. The next result characterizes the set of such
functions that can rationalize the data under Assumptions 1, 7 and 8.
Definition 4 (Identified Set under Imperfect Foresight). For any pi ∈ Π, we call Ci(pi) the
collection of functions C : Y × Z → R+ such that there exists a σ-algebra I and a random
vector (Y0, Y1,D,Z) where ((1−D)Y0 +DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumptions 7
and 8 are satisfied. Denote by C˜i(pi) the set of functions in Ci(pi) that are independent of y.
The next theorem provides a characterization of the identified set Ci(pi) with moment
inequalities.
Theorem 2 (Characterization under Imperfect Foresight). For any pi ∈ Π, the identified
set Ci(pi) is equal to the set of non negative measurable functions C on Y × Z such that
y 7→ y −C(y, z) is continuous and increasing for each z, and for all ordered pairs z ≥ z˜ on
the support of Z, E(Y −DC(Y,Z)|Z = z) ≥ E(Y − DC(Y,Z)|Z = z˜), where (Y,D,Z) is
any vector with distribution pi.
We observe a similar relation between Assumptions 8 and 8′ as between Assumptions 4
and 4′. Indeed, if a cost function rationalizes the data under Assumptions 1, 7 and the
weaker 8′, the characterization in Theorem 2 holds. Conversely, if the characterization in
Theorem 2 holds, then the cost function rationalizes the data under Assumptions 1, 7 and
the stronger Assumption 8.
14 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD ME´ANGO, AND ISMAE¨L MOURIFIE´
As before, we now seek to characterize a minimal cost function that rationalizes the
data under the imperfect foresight Roy model in closed form. Following the reasoning
of the perfect foresight case, we start from Theorem 2, which characterizes cost func-
tions that rationalize the data with the monotonicity in z of the conditional expecta-
tion E[Y − DC(Y,Z)|Z = z]. Since C is non negative, we seek functions C such that
E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|Z = z] = inf{E[Y |Z = z˜]; z˜ ≥ z}, the lower monotone envelope of E[Y |Z =
z]. This would yield the constraint E[C(Y,Z)|D = 1, Z = z] = C(z), where C is defined
in (3.2) below. Cost functions satisfying the constraint share the same expectation and
would not be ordered, leading to a multiplicity of minimal cost functions. We therefore
limit our search to cost functions that are functions of z only, as in the case, where sector
selection is based on the comparison of expected quasilinear utilities. The following corollary
of Theorem 2 establishes that C of (3.2) is the minimum of the set C˜i(pi) of functions of z
that rationalize the data under the imperfect foresight extended Roy model. The maximum
cost function is obtained straightforwardly using the worst case bound, as in Section 1.3.
Corollary 3. For any pi ∈ Π such that C˜i(pi) is non empty, the minimum and maximum
of C˜i(pi) are the function C and C¯ defined for any z on the support of Z by1
C(z) = P(D = 1|Z = z)−1
(
E[Y |Z = z]− inf
z˜≥z
E[Y |Z = z˜]
)
1{P(D = 1|Z = z) > 0},
C¯(z) = P(D = 1|Z = z)−1
(
E[Y |Z = z]− sup
z˜≤z
E[Y (1−D) + bD|Z = z˜]
)
.
(3.2)
Remark (Testability). Note that C˜i(pi) is non empty if Ci(pi) is. Indeed, it follows from
Theorem 2 that C∗(z) := E(C(Y,Z)|D = 1, Z = z)1{P (D = 1|Z = z) > 0} is in Ci(pi) if C
is. Moreover, any pi that satisfies P(D = 1|Z) > 0 on the support of Z has non empty C˜i(pi),
which implies that the model is not testable in that case. Indeed, in that case, C defined in
Corollary 3 is in C˜i(pi). However, if pi is such that P(D = 1|Z = z) = P(D = 1|Z = z˜) = 0
and E[Y |Z = z] < E[Y |Z = z˜] for z ≥ z˜ on the support of Z, then Ci = ∅, so that
Assumptions 1, 7 and 8 are jointly rejected.
3.2. Random Cost. In an extension of the selection model of Assumption 2, consider
the case where the cost function is not restricted to deterministic functions of potential
outcome Y1 and observable covariate Z, but may depend on unobservable heterogeneity as
well.
Assumption GRM. The selection indicator satisfies Yd−dC > Y1−d− (1−d)C ⇒ D = d,
for d = 0, 1, C is a non negative random variable, and (Y0, Y1−C) is stochastically monotone
non decreasing with respect to Z.
If choices are driven by the comparison of utilities in both sectors ud(Yd, Z, η), for d = 0, 1,
where η is a vector of heterogeneous drivers of utility, that are observed by the agents but
1We use the convention x/0 = +∞ for any x ≥ 0.
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not the analyst, then Assumption GRM holds with C = Y1 − u
−1
0 (u1(Y1, Z, η), Z, η), where
the inverse of u0 is taken relative to the first argument. In the context of women’s major
choices, the unobserved heterogeneity component η may embody unobserved preferences for
a major and unobserved quality of the different programs under consideration. If choices are
driven by the comparison of expected utilities in both sectors E[ud(Yd, Z, η)|I], for d = 0, 1,
where I is the σ-algebra characterizing the agent’s information set at the time of major
choice, then Assumption GRM holds with C = Y1 − Y0 + E[u0(Y0, Z, η) − u1(Y1, Z, η)|I].
The Assumption is also compatible with different priors about the (lack of) rationality of
decision makers.
Definition 5 (Identified Set for Random Cost). For any pi ∈ Π, we call Cr(pi) the collection
of non negative random variables C such that there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1,D,Z)
where ((1−D)Y0 +DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumption GRM is satisfied.
In analogy with the exercise of the previous section, we seek bounds on the distribution
of costs C that rationalize the data. Consider the envelope distribution F of (1.3). A
minimal cost in first order stochastic dominance must satisfy Y − DC = Y e ∼ F , if the
latter is feasible. This is equivalent to C = Y − Y e under the constraints Y e ∼ F and
(1−D)(Y −Y e) = 0. If the second constraint is feasible, the lower bound on the distribution
of the difference Y − Y e with given fixed marginals will provide the lower bound on the
distribution of random costs that rationalize the data under Assumption GRM. Note that,
unlike the case of the extended Roy model of Section 3, the cost is no longer restricted to
be a deterministic function of Yd and Z, but can also depend on unobservable heterogeneity
as well. Hence the joint distribution of (Y, Y e) is only restricted by the marginals, and
the copula is unrestricted, when obtaining the lower bound on the distribution for Y − Y e
(equivalently the upper bound on the cumulative distribution function). A similar reasoning
applies for maximal costs. We formalize this in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let pi ∈ Π be a distribution for observable variables (Y,D,Z). If C ∈ Cr(pi),
then for each y and z, FL(y|z, 1) ≤ P(C ≤ y|Z = z,D = 1) ≤ FU (y|z, 1), where
FL(y|z, 1) := sup
y˜
max
{
0, F (y˜|Z = z,D = 1)− F¯ (y˜ − y|z, 1)
}
,
FU (y|z, 1) := 1 + inf
y˜
min {0, F (y˜|Z = z,D = 1)− F (y˜ − y|z, 1)} ,
F (y|z, 1) := p(z)−1 [F (y|z)− F (y|z)] 1{p(z) > 0}+ F (y|z, 1),
F¯ (y|z, 1) := p(z)−1
[
F¯ (y|z) − F (y|z)
]
1{p(z) > 0}+ F (y|z, 1),
where p(z) := P(D = 1|Z = z) is the propensity score.
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4. Empirical investigation of major choices in Germany
There is ample evidence that women are severely under-represented in STEM univer-
sity majors and even more so in STEM fields (see for instance Beede et al. [2011], Zafar
[2013] and Hunt et al. [2013]). Evidence on women’s reasons for shunning STEM fields (see
for instance Kahn and Ginther [2017]) include mathematics gender stereotypes and gender
biased amenities, such as family friendliness and work/life balance. Our objective is to
document the amplitude of such non pecuniary motivations as revealed in the form of a
gender-specific cost of choosing STEM fields. The revealed cost of STEM fields is a function
of the rate of feminization of the STEM faculty in the region at the time of choice. We
therefore also shed light on the importance of role models in the determination of major
choice (Kahn and Ginther [2017]).
4.1. Data. Our empirical analysis relies on surveys of German nationally representative
university graduates. The data are collected by the German Centre for Higher Education
Research and Science Studies (DZHW) as part of the DZHW Graduate Survey Series.
Data and methodology are described in Baillet et al. [2017]. The waves we consider include
graduates who obtained their highest degree during the academic years 2004-2005 and
2008-2009 respectively. Graduates were interviewed 1 year and 5 years after graduation2. At
that point, extensive information was collected on their educational experience, employment
history, including wages and hours worked, along with detailed socio-economic variables and
geographical information about the region where the Abitur (high school final exam) was
completed. We merge the fields of study into two categories. We call STEM the category,
which consists of mathematics, physical, life and computer sciences, as well as engineering
and related fields. The remaining majors are merged in the non-STEM-degree category. We
only consider graduates from institutions in the country of the survey, who are active on their
respective country’s labor market at the time of the interview. We exclude all respondents
who are still in education, have never worked or are currently inactive, unemployed, in
part-time employment or self-employed. We keep only graduates who hold a “Bachelor”,
“Magister” or “Diplom”, excluding those with “Staatsexamen” and “Lehramt” degrees,
which are specific tracks mainly for teachers. Our stochastically monotone instrumental
variable (SMIV), which we call “feminization of STEM,” is defined as the proportion of
women among faculty members by field of study in universities in the individual’s region
(Land) of residence at the time of choice. This variable is calculated for each individual
in the sample from data on gender distribution of faculty by field and by Land provided
by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (DESTATIS). The data set provides for each
2The response rate was 25% for the 2005 cohort, with 39.5% attrition in the second wave, and 20% for
the 2009 cohort with 14% attrition in the second wave.
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year between 1998 and 2010, the count of faculty members (Scientific and artistic staff
“Wissenschaftliches und Knstlerisches Personal”) by gender in ten fields of study. The
variable is computed from the aggregation of mathematics, science and engineering.
4.2. Descriptive statistics. The category of individuals we consider consists of women
from the former West Germany3. The variables we consider are average income during the
first year after graduation, which serves as outcome variable Y , the choice of majorD, which
takes value 1 if the chosen sector is STEM and 0 otherwise, and the feminization of STEM,
which serves as our SMIV instrumental variable Z. Table 1 gives proportions of STEM
Table 1. Sample of women and comparison with men
Women Men
2005 2009 2005 2009
STEM 423 247 1,018 712
Other 1,226 1,276 780 690
majors among women from the former West Germany in 2005 and 2009, as compared
to proportions of STEM majors among men of the same category. Figure 1 shows the
Figure 1. Distribution of Proportion of female faculty by field
3For the sample of women from the former East Germany, the results (omitted here for space constraints)
reveal much lower costs of STEM. The difference in behavior between the former East and West may be
partly attributable to differences in gender stereotypes, as evidenced in Lippmann and Senik [2018]
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distribution of the feminization of STEM variable for cohorts graduating in 2005 and 2009.
The relation between income, field of study and feminization of STEM is investigated with
Figure 2. Relation between D and Z
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an estimation of the propensity score (probability of choosing STEM) as a function of
feminization of STEM in 2005 and 2009 in Figure 2 and quartile regressions of income as
a function of the feminization of STEM for 2005 and 2009 in Figure 3. Figure 2 shows a
Figure 3. Relation between Y and Z
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positive relationship between major choice and feminization of STEM (which may or may
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not be causal). Figure 3 shows a violation of stochastic monotonicity of income relative
to the feminization of STEM, which explains the rejection of the pure Roy model for this
category of individuals in Mourifie´ et al. [2020].
4.3. Empirical methodology. We now propose an inference procedure for the minimal
cost function of Corollary 2. The upper bound can be treated symmetrically. However,
it is uninformative in our data. For any given value of z ∈ Z, we seek a data driven
function y 7→ Cn(y, z) such that for each y ∈ Y,
lim
n→∞
P(Cn(y, z) ≤ C(y, z)) ≥ 1− α, (4.1)
for some pre-determined level of significance α. Define G(y|z, z˜) := P(Y ≤ y|z˜) − P(Y ≤
y,D = 0|z). Call Gˆ a non parametric estimator for G, and define
Gˆ−(x|z, z˜) := sup
{
y ∈ Y : Gˆ(y|z, z˜) ≤ x
}
.
Finally, let Fˆ1 be a nonparametric estimator for F1(y|z) := P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z). In practice,
we use nonparametric estimation procedures in Li and Racine [2008]. Lemma 2 (proved in
the appendix) shows the applicability of the methodology in Chernozhukov et al. [2013].
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 5 and assuming G(y|z, z˜) := P(Y ≤ y|z˜)−P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z)
is continuous and increasing in y for all z, z˜, we have
C(y, z) ≥ y − inf
z˜≥z
G−(F1(y|z)|z, z˜), where G−(x|z, z˜) := sup{y ∈ Y : G(y|z, z˜) ≤ x}.
Let sn(y; z, z˜) be a standard error for the estimator Gˆ−(Fˆ1(y|z)|z, z˜) and c
α
n(y; z) be the
critical value of Definition 3 in Chernozhukov et al. [2013]. Then, under the assumptions
of Theorem 6 of Chernozhukov et al. [2013],
Cn(y, z) := y − inf
z˜≤z
{
Gˆ−(Fˆ1(y|z)|z, z˜) + c
α
n(y; z)sn(y; z, z˜)
}
satisfies requirement (4.1). Details of the procedure are given in Appendix D.
5. Findings
Figure 4 shows the lower bound of a one-sided 95% confidence region for the cost function.
More precisely, it represents a function Cn(y, z) of income and feminization of STEM, such
that lim
n→∞
P(Cn(y, z) ≤ C(y, z)) ≥ 0.95, where C is the lower bound of the identified set.
It is lower in 2009 than in 2005, which is in line with the increased feminization of STEM
over time (seen in Figure 1), but the shape is similar. We observe that costs tend to be
high for low income individuals and remain high for high income individuals, when the rate
of feminization of STEM is low. Figures 5-7 show different ways to visualize the data from
Figure 4. Figure 5 shows, for each cost level c0, the proportion of individuals with Cn ≥ c0,
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Figure 4. One-sided confidence region for minimum cost
(a) 2005 (b) 2009
Figure 5. Distribution of costs in the population
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averaged over three different bins of the feminization of STEM variable Z (diamond, circle
and triangle curves) and their union (thick curve). Panels (a) and (b) show this for 2005
and 2009 respectively. Figure 6 is identical to Figure 5, except that the x axis is now cost
level divided by income. So in Panel (a) of Figure 6 for instance, the triangle curve tells
us that about 5% of individuals with Z ∈ [0.17, 0.19) have Cn/Y at least as large as 0.2.
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Figure 6. Distribution of costs as proportion of income in the population
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Panel (a) of Figure 7 places the thick curves of Figures 6(a) and (b) together, and similarly,
Figure 7. Comparison 2005 - 2009
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Panel (b) of Figure 7 places the thick curves of Figures 5(a) and (b) together for an easier
comparison of 2005 and 2009. In Figure 5 and 7(b), we observe that among the 2005
graduation cohort, 9 out of 10 have positive minimum cost function, and 4 out of 10 have
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minimum cost larger than 5, 000 euros. This falls to 6 in 10 and 2 in 10 respectively, for
the 2009 cohort. In Figure 6 and 7(a), we observe that among the 2005 graduation cohort, 5
out of 10 have minimum cost function larger than 20% of their income, and 3 out of 10 have
minimum cost larger than 40% of their income. This falls to 2 in 10 and 1 in 10 respectively,
for the 2009 cohort. Costs decrease sharply as the feminization rate increases in both years.
These results suggest that policies promoting a higher representation of female faculty in
STEM fields could reduce the perceived cost of STEM for the next generation.
6. Discussion
The objective of this paper was to uncover gender specific costs of choosing STEM fields
based on minimal behavioral assumptions. We assumed that the choice of (STEM ver-
sus non STEM) major is determined on the basis of the maximization of Yd − dC(Yd, Z),
for d = 1 (STEM) or d = 0 (non STEM), where Yd is potential income in Sector d, Z
is the proportion of women on the STEM faculty in the individual’s region, and C(y, z)
is the cost function of interest. As the choice C(y, z) = 0 can rationalize any joint dis-
tribution for (Y,D,Z), we rely on the additional identification restriction that potential
incomes (Y0, Y1) are stochastically monotone in Z, as in Mourifie´ et al. [2020], and C(y, z)
is non increasing in z. With our choice of instrument Z, this restriction is interpreted as a
positive (or neutral) effect of role models during university education on future prospects.
Under this assumption, we characterized the (sharp) identified region for the function C
as well as sharp lower and upper bounds in closed form. Confidence regions, derived using
existing inference methods (see Chernozhukov et al. [2013]), reveal large costs of STEM
fields for German female university graduates, especially for low realized income levels, and
low presence of role models (as measured by the regional rate of feminization of the STEM
faculty).
We interpret the revealed cost function C as a compensating wage differential, but our
current methodology cannot disentangle the role of real or perceived gender biased dis-
amenities of STEM fields, in terms of family friendliness and work/life balance, from be-
havioral and preference biases related to gender stereotypes. An area of concern regarding
the validity of our identifying stochastic monotonicity assumption is the aggregation in the
STEM category, of areas such as engineering, with extremely low feminization rates and
high relative incomes, with areas such as life sciences, with high feminization rates and low
relative incomes. Access to more disaggregated data on the proportions of female faculty
in mathematics intensive fields (rather than STEM fields as traditionally classified) would
considerably alleviate this concern.
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Appendix A. Proofs of results in the main text
In the proof of Lemma 1 as well as Theorem 1, we rely on a fundamental characterization of first order stochastic
dominance, which is stated in Proposition 2 below, and which can be found, for instance, in Shaked and Shanthikumar
[2007], Section 6.B.1.
Definition 6 (Upper Sets). A set U ⊆ Rk is called an upper set if y ∈ U implies y˜ ∈ U for all y˜ ≥ y.
Proposition 2 (Characterization of First Order Stochastic Dominance). A random vector X1 is first order stochas-
tically dominated by a random vector X2 if and only if P(X1 ∈ U) ≤ P(X2 ∈ U) for all upper sets U in R
k.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume (Y0, Y1) to be stochastically monotone non decreasing with respect to Z. Fix z and z˜
in the support of Z, such that z ≥ z˜. Fix an upper set U in R2. P((Y0, Y1 − C(Y1, Z)) ∈ U |Z = z) = P((Y0, Y1) ∈
G−1(U,Z)|Z = z), where G is defined by G((y0, y1), z) = (y0, y1 − C(y1, z)). Since G is increasing in the compo-
nentwise order of R2, G−1(U, z) is also an upper set, and Proposition 2 yields P((Y0, Y1) ∈ G
−1(U, z)|Z = z) ≥
P((Y0, Y1) ∈ G
−1(U, z)|Z = z˜). Since C is non increasing in z, the right-hand-side of the latter inequality is at least
as large as P((Y0, Y1) ∈ G
−1(U, z˜)|Z = z˜) = P((Y0, Y1 −C(Y1, z˜)) ∈ U |Z = z˜). We have therefore proved that for any
upper set U , P((Y0, Y1 −C(Y1, z)) ∈ U |Z = z) ≥ P((Y0, Y1 −C(Y1, z˜)) ∈ U |Z = z˜), for any z ≥ z˜, which is equivalent
to stochastic monotonicity of (Y0, Y1 − C(Y1, Z)) with respect to Z, as required. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix any pi ∈ Π, and any C ∈ C(pi). By Definition 3, there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1, D,Z)
where ((1 − D)Y0 + DY1,D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumptions 1, 2, 3(2) and 4 are satisfied. Call Y := (1 −
D)Y0 +DY1. For any y ∈ Y , by Assumption 2, Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤ y if and only if Y0 ≤ y and Y1 − C(Y1, Z) ≤ y, so
that P(Y −DC(Y, Z) ≤ y|Z) = P(Y0 ≤ y, Y1 − C(Y1, Z) ≤ y|Z). By Assumption 4 and Proposition 2, the latter is
monotone non increasing in z. Hence, for any y ∈ Y , P(Y −DC(Y,Z) > y|Z = z) is non decreasing in z, so for any
ordered pair z ≥ z˜, of the support of Z, (1.2) holds. In addition, P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≥ b|Z = z) ≥ P(Y0 ≥ b|Z = z) = 1.
Conversely, suppose the non negative measurable function C on Y ×Z satisfies (1.2) for all ordered pairs z ≥ z˜ of
the support of Z. Then, by the characterization of first order stochastic dominance in Proposition 2, Y −DC(Y,Z)
is stochastically monotone with respect to Z. Thus, if we define Y0 := Y − DC(Y, Z) and take Y1 := g
−1(Y −
DC(Y,Z), Z) with g(y, z) := y − C(y, z) and g−1 its inverse with respect to the first argument, the vector (Y0, Y1 −
C(Y1, Z)) is equal to (Y −DC(Y,Z), Y −DC(Y,Z)), which is also stochastically monotone with respect to Z. Hence
Assumption 4 holds for such a pair (Y0, Y1). Since Y0 = Y −DC(Y,Z) = Y1−C(Y1, Z), Assumption 2 is also trivially
satisfied, since it places non constraint on D in case of a tie. Finally, (1 − D)Y0 +DY1 = Y . Indeed, when D = 0,
we have Y0 = Y −DC(Y,Z) = Y , and when D = 1, we have Y1 = g
−1(Y −DC(Y, Z)) = g−1(Y − C(Y, Z)) = Y (by
definition of g) as required. Hence, there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1, D,Z) where ((1 − D)Y0 + DY1, D,Z) has
distribution pi and Assumptions 2, 3(2) and 4 are satisfied, and C therefore belongs to the identified set C(pi). 
Lemma 3 (Monotone Envelope). The following hold for F and F¯ defined in (1.3):
(1) For each z ∈ Z, y 7→ F (y|z) and y 7→ F¯ (y|z) are cdfs.
(2) If F˜ (·|z) is a cdf satisfying P(Y ≤ y|z) ≤ F˜ (y|z) ≤ P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) + P(D = 1|z)1{y ≥ b} for all (y, z),
and z 7→ F˜ (y|z) non increasing in z for all y, then F (y|z) ≤ F˜ (y|z) ≤ F¯ (y|z) for all (y, z).
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the results relating to F . The results relating to F¯ are treated symmetrically. Let M
be the set of non decreasing real valued functions from R to [0, 1]. Define the operator S by
S : 2M → M
K 7→ S(K),
where S(K) is defined for each y ∈ R by S(K)(y) = sup{F (y); F ∈ K}. Note that S(K) is uniquely defined and
belongs to M as required. Next, define the operator R by
R : M → M
F 7→ R(F ),
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where R(F ) is defined for each y ∈ R by R(F )(y) = lim
y˜↓y
F (y˜). Note that R(F ) is uniquely defined and belongs to M
as required. In addition, R is idempotent: R(F ) is right-continuous by construction, so that R(R(F )) = R(F ), and
monotone: if F1 ≤ F2, then R(F1) ≤ R(F2).
Define FK := R(S(K)). We first show that FK is a cdf if K is a collection of cdfs bounded above by the
cdf F¯ := 1{· ≥ b}. Indeed, FK is non decreasing by construction of S and T , FK is right-continuous because R is
idempotent, FK tends to 1 at +∞ since each element ofK is a cdf. Finally, FK tends to 0 at −∞ since 0 ≤ FK ≤ R(F¯ ).
Define Kz := {F (·|z˜) : z˜ ≥ z}. Then, F
e of Lemma 3 is equal for each z ∈ Z to F e(·|z) = R(S(Kz)). By construction,
S(Kz) ≤ S(Kz˜) for z˜ ≥ z. Hence, by monotonicity of R, F
e(y|z) is monotone non increasing in z. Putting it all
together, we obtain the first result of Lemma 3.
Next, if (y, z) 7→ F˜ (y|z) is a conditional cdf, such that F˜ (y|z) ≥ F (y|z) for each (y, z) and F˜ is monotone non
increasing in z for each y, then F˜ (·|z) ≥ sup
z˜≥z
F˜ (·|z) ≥ sup
z˜≥z
F (·|z) = S(Kz). Now, R(F˜ (·|z)) = F˜ (·|z) since the latter
is right-continuous. Finally, monotonicity of R yields F˜ (·|z) ≥ R(S(Kz)) := F
e(·|z), which is the second result of
Lemma 3. 
Proof of Corollary 1. From Equation (1.5) proved in the main text for all y ∈ Y , we get L(y − C(y, z)|z) ≤ P(Y −
C(Y, Z) ≤ y−C(y, z),D = 1|z) ≤ U(y−C(y, z)|z). By the definition of U− and by the invertibility of y 7→ y−C(y, z),
the second inequality implies y − C(y, z) ≥ U−(F1(y|z)|z) as desired. Similarly, by the definition of L− and by the
invertibility of y 7→ y − C(y, z), the first inequality implies y − C(y, z) ≤ L−(F1(y|z)|z). 
Proof of Corollary 2. (1) First, we show that y 7→ y−C(y, z) is increasing, hence invertible since it is continuous. The
function y 7→ F (y|z)− P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) is increasing and continuous and thus, so is y 7→ L(y|z) := F (y|z)− P(Y ≤
y,D = 0|z). So y − C(y, z) = L− (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z) = L
−1 (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z) is increasing in y for all z ∈ Z
because both L−1(y|z) and P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z) are increasing. (2) Second, we prove that C(y, z) is non negative. We
have L(y|z) = F (y|z) − P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) ≥ P(Y ≤ y|z)− P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) = P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z). So we have that
L(y|z) ≥ P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z) and we already know that L−1(y|z) is increasing and continuous, so that L−1 (L(y|z)|z) ≥
L−1 (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z), hence y ≥ L− (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z) or 0 ≤ y − L− (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z) = C(y, z), as
desired. (3) We now show that P(Y −C(Y, z) ≤ y,D = 1|z) = F (y|z)−P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z). As we have shown before,
C(y, z) = y − L−1 (P(Y ≤ y,D = 1|z)|z). Hence P(Y − C(Y, z) ≤ y,D = 1|z) = P(L−1(F1(Y |z)|z) ≤ y,D = 1|z) =
P(F1(Y |z) ≤ L(y|z), D = 1|z) = L(y, z), since F1 is continuous and increasing. (4) Finally, by Theorem 1, it suffices
to show that Y −DC(Y,Z) is stochastically monotone with respect to Z. We have
P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤ y|z) = P(Y −DC(Y,Z) ≤ y,D = 1|z) + P(Y −DC(Y, Z) ≤ y,D = 0|z)
= P(Y − C(Y, Z) ≤ y,D = 1|z) + P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z)
= F (y|z)− P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) + P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) = F (y|z)
and F (y|z) is stochastically monotone by construction.

Proof of Proposition 1. We show Proposition 1(2). Inverses are with respect to the first variable only. Differentiat-
ing u0(u
−1
0
(u, z), z) = u with respect to z yields
∇zu
−1
0
(u, z) = −
(
∂u0
∂y
(u−1
0
(u, z), z)
)−1
∇zu0(u
−1
0
(u, z), z). (A.1)
Plugging (A.1) taken at u = u1(y, z) into the expression for ∇zC(y, z) yields:
∇zC(y, z) =
(
∂u0
∂y
(u−1
0
(u1(y, z), z), z)
)−1 (
∇zu0(u
−1
0
(u1(y, z), z), z)−∇zu1(y, z)
)
. (A.2)
The result follows. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. Fix any pi ∈ Π, and any C ∈ Ci(pi). By Definition 4, there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1, D,Z)
where ((1−D)Y0+DY1, D,Z) has distribution pi and Assumptions 7 and 8 are satisfied. Call Y := (1−D)Y0+DY1.
By Assumption 7, if D = 1, then E[Y − DC(Y,Z)|I] = E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I] ≥ E[Y0|I]. Similarly, if D = 0, then
E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|I] = E[Y0|I] ≥ E[Y1−C(Y1, Z)|I]. Hence, E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|I] = max{E[Y0|I],E[Y1−C(Y1, Z)|I]}. By
Imperfect Foresight Monotonicity (Assumption 8), E[Y −DC(Y,Z)|I] is therefore stochastically monotone with respect
to Z. Since Z is I-measurable, iterated expectations yields monotonicity of the function z 7→ E[Y −DC(Y, Z)|Z = z]
as required.
Conversely, suppose the non negative measurable function C on Y × Z is such that E[Y − DC(Y, Z)|Z = z] is
monotonic non decreasing in z. Thus, if we define Y0 := Y − DC(Y, Z) and take Y1 := g
−1(Y − DC(Y, Z)) with
g(y, z) := y−C(y, z), the vector (Y0, Y1−C(Y1, Z)) is equal to (Y −DC(Y,Z), Y −DC(Y,Z)), and therefore satisfies
Assumption 8. Assumption 2 is also trivially satisfied, since it places non constraint on D in case of a tie. Finally,
(1 − D)Y0 + DY1 = Y . Hence, there exists a random vector (Y0, Y1,D, Z) where ((1 − D)Y0 + DY1,D, Z) has
distribution pi and Assumptions 7 and 8 are satisfied, and C therefore belongs to the identified set Ci(pi). 
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider a pi such that C˜i(pi) is non empty and consider an arbitrary function C in C˜i(pi).
By Theorem 2, E[Y − DC(Z)|Z = z] = E[Y |Z = z] − p(z)C(z) is non decreasing on the support of Z. Hence
E[Y |Z = z]− p(z)C(z) ≤ inf
z˜≥z
E[Y |Z = z˜]. So C(z) ≥ C(z), by the definition of C in Equation (3.2). Conversely, we
now show that C(z) rationalizes the data under the imperfect foresight model. To see this, define Y1 = Y +(1−D)C(Z)
and Y0 = Y − DC(Z). We have Y = DY1 + (1 − D)Y0 and E[Y1 − C(Z)|Z] = E[Y0|Z], so that Assumption 7 is
trivially satisfied. Finally, E[Y0|Z = z] = E[Y1 − C(Z)|Z = z] = E[Y − DC(Z)|Z = z] = E[Y |Z = z] − p(z)C(z) =
inf
z˜≥z
E[Y |Z = z˜], which is non decreasing by construction, so that Assumption 8 is also satisfied, as required. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Given a distribution pi ∈ Π, let C be in Cr(pi). We give the proof for the upper bound on the
distribution of costs. The lower bound is treated symmetrically. By Assumption GRM, Y −DC = max{Y0, Y1 −C},
which is stochastically monotone with respect to Z. Call F˜ (·|z) the cumulative distribution function of Y − DC
conditionally on Z = z and write Y˜ := Y − DC. Since Y˜ = Y when D = 0, the cumulative distribution of Y˜
conditional on Z = z and D = 1 is
F˜ (y|z, 1) :=
1
p(z)
[
F˜ (y|z)− F (y|z)
]
1{p(z) > 0}+ F (y|z, 1).
By construction, C = Y −Y˜ whenD = 1, so that conditionally onD = 1, C is the difference between Y with cumulative
distribution function F (·|z,1) and Y˜ with cumulative distribution function F˜ (·|z, 1). Hence, by Proposition 1 in
Ru¨schendorf [1982], P(C ≤ y|Z = z,D = 1) ≤ 1 + infy˜ min{0, F (y˜|z), 1) − F˜ (y˜ − y|z, 1)}, which is the upper bound
on the cumulative distribution of the difference between two random variables with given marginals.
By the construction of F (·|z) in (1.3,) and the fact that Y˜ is stochastically monotone with respect to Z and
that Y˜ = Y −DC ≤ Y , we have F˜ (y|z) ≥ F (y|z) for any y by Lemma 3. Hence
F˜ (y|z, 1) =
1
p(z)
[
F˜ (y|z)− F (y|z)
]
1{p(z) > 0}+ F (y|z, 1)
≥
1
p(z)
[F (y|z)− F (y|z)] 1{p(z) > 0}+ F (y|z, 1) = F (y|z, 1),
which in turn implies P(C ≤ y|Z = z,D = 1) ≤ 1 + infy˜min{0, F (y˜|z,1) − F (y˜ − y|z, 1)} as required. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. Under Assumption 5, L(y|z) is continuous and increasing. Hence, we have:
L(y|z) = sup
y˜≤y
{F (y˜|z)− P(Y ≤ y˜, D = 0|z)}
= F (y˜|z)− P(Y ≤ y˜,D = 0|z)
= lim
y˜↓y
sup
z˜≤z
P(Y ≤ y˜|z˜)− P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z)
= lim
y˜↓y
{
sup
z˜≤z
P(Y ≤ y˜|z˜)− P(Y ≤ y˜,D = 0|z)
}
= sup
z˜≤z
G(y|z, z˜).
Since L is continuous and increasing, it can also be written
L(y|z) = sup
y˜≤y
sup
z˜≤z
G(y˜|z, z˜) = sup
z˜≤z
sup
y˜≤y
G(y˜|z, z˜).
Defining G˜(y|z, z˜) := sup
y˜≤y
G(y˜|z, z˜), G˜(y|z, z˜) ≤ sup
z˜≤z
G˜(y|z, z˜) implies
L−(x|z) := sup{y : L(y|z) ≤ x} ≤ G˜−(x|z, z˜) := sup{y : G˜(y|z, z˜) ≤ x},
for all z˜ ≤ z. Hence L−(x|z) ≤ inf
z˜≤z
G˜−(x|z, z˜). Finally, by continuity of G and by the definition of G˜, we
have G˜−(x|z, z˜) ≤ G−(x|z, z˜) := sup{y : G(y|z, z˜) ≤ x}. The upper bound is treated similarly. 
Appendix B. Structural underpinnings of the imperfect foresight model
The selection rule of Assumption 7 can be interpreted as a transformation of a decision rule based on relative
expected utilities in both sectors, assuming very specific utility functions. Assumption 2 is the special case of As-
sumption 7, where the vector (Y0, Y1) of potential outcomes is I-measurable. Other examples include the following:
(1) Suppose utility in Sector d is ud(Yd, Z) := Yd + gd(Z), and Sector d is chosen when E[ud(Yd, Z)|I] >
E[u1−d(Y1−d, Z)|I]. Then Assumption 7 holds with C(y, z) := g0(z) − g1(z), as long as the latter is non
negative.
(2) Suppose utility in Sector d, is ud(Yd, Z) := gd(Z)Yd, with gd > 0 for d = 0, 1, and Sector d chosen if
E[ud(Yd, Z)|I] > E[u1−d(Y1−d, Z)|I]. Then Assumption 7 holds with C(y, z) := y(1− g1(z)/g0(z)), as long
as the latter is non negative.
(3) Suppose utility in Sector d is quadratic, i.e.,
ud(Yd, Z) = Yd − ηd(Z)Y
2, with Y ≤ infzmind{1/(2ηd(Z))} a.s.,
and suppose E[Y 20 |I]/E[Y
2
1 |I] = f(Z) ≤ 1, (given relative proportions of women in STEM and non STEM,
the information from historical data about the price of women’s talent in STEM is noisier), then Assump-
tion 7 holds with C(y, z) := (η1(z)− η0(z)f(z))y
2 , as long as the latter is non negative.
(4) Suppose utility in Sector d is isoelastic, i.e.,
ud(Yd) =
Y 1−ρ
d
− 1
1− ρ
,
with relative risk aversion coefficient ρ > 1. Suppose also that Yd = exp(Xd), where Xd, conditionally
on Z = z, is distributed according to N
(
µd(z), σ
2
d(z)
)
. Then expected utility is
E[ud(Yd, Z)|Z = z] =
exp{(1 − ρ)
(
µd(z)− (ρ− 1)σ
2
d
(z)/2
)
}
1− ρ
,
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and sector selection is based on the comparison of E[Y1 − C(Y1, Z)|I] and E[Y0|I], with
C(y, z) =
(
1− exp
(
σ2
0
(z)− σ2
1
(z)
2
ρ
))
y, when σ20(z) < σ
2
1(z).
Hence, Assumption 7 holds if the variance of Sector 1 outcomes is higher than the variance of Sector 0
outcomes.
Appendix C. Point identification of the cost function
In this section, we describe how Equation (3.1) can be used to prove the identification result of d’Haultfœuille and Maurel
[2013]. The extended Roy model in this section does not rely on the restriction that the cost function associated with
Sector 1 be non negative. However, it assumes that the cost function is a function of exogenous observables only (here
the vector Z) and that the potential outcomes have a separable representation summarized in the following statement
of Assumptions in d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013].
Assumption 9. Observable and potential outcomes are related by Y = DY1 +(1−D)Y0. The selection indicator D
satisfies E[Yd − dC(Z)|I] > E[Y1−d − (1 − d)C(Z)|I] ⇒ D = d, where Z is measurable with respect to the agent’s
information σ-algebra I, and E[Y1 − Y0|I] = E[Y1 − Y0|Z] + V with V ⊥ Z.
If C is a function of z only and E[Y1 −Y0|I] = E[Y1 −Y0|Z] + V with V ⊥ Z, then (3.1) yields E[Y −DC(Z)|I] =
max{0,E[Y1 − Y0 − C(Z)|I]}+ E[Y0|I], hence E[Y − Y0|I]− C(Z)P[D = 1|I] = max{0,E[Y1 − Y0|Z]− C(Z) + V }.
Iterated expectations then yields
E[Y − Y0|Z]− C(Z)P[D = 1|Z] = E[max{0,E[Y1 − Y0|Z]− C(Z) + V }|Z]. (C.1)
To differentiate both terms with respect to the first component of Z, we make the following regularity assumptions,
where Z−1 (resp. z−1) is the vector of components of Z (resp. z) excluding Z1 (resp. z1).
Assumption 10. For all z−1 on the support of Z−1, the functions z1 7→ C(z), z1 7→ E[Yd|D = d, Z = z], d = 0, 1,
and z1 7→ E[D|Z = z] are continuously differentiable on the support of Z1 conditional on Z−1 = z−1.
By Assumption 10 and the dominated convergence theorem, the partial derivative of the right-hand side of (C.1)
is
∂
∂z1
E[max{0,E[Y1 − Y0|Z]− C(Z) + V }|Z] = P[D = 1|Z = z]
∂
∂z1
(E[Y1 − Y0|Z]− C(Z)) ,
whereas the differentiating the left-hand side yields
(E[Y − Y0|Z = z]− C(z))
∂
∂z1
P[D = 1|Z = z]
+ P[D = 1|Z = z]
∂
∂z1
(E[Y − Y0|Z = z]− C(z)) .
Finally, we have
C(z)
∂
∂z1
P[D = 1|Z = z] =
∂
∂z1
(E[Y − Y0|Z = z]− P[D = 1|Z = z]
∂
∂z1
(E[Y1 − Y0|Z = z],
which can be rearranged into Equation (2.6) in d’Haultfœuille and Maurel [2013], and which identifies the cost function
if conditional means of potential outcomes are identified.
Appendix D. Additional details on the inference procedure
Inference for the lower bound proceeds according to the following steps:
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(1) Estimate the empirical counterparts of distribution functions P(Y ≤ y|z), P(Y ≤ y,D = 0|z) and P(D = 1|z)
on a fine grid of Y , GY and a predefined grid on Z, GZ = [0.12, 0.13, ...,0.19], by local linear regression,
using Epanechnikov kernels. Results presented are for h = 0.066. Qualitatively similar results obtained for
h/2, and h/3.
(2) For each pair (z, z˜) ∈ GZ × GZ , and y˜ ∈ GY , calculate:
L(y˜, z˜, z) = Pˆ (Y ≤ y˜|z˜) − Pˆ (Y ≤ y˜,D = 0|z).
and apply the monotonic transformation:
L∗ε(y˜, z˜, z) = max {L(y˜, z˜, z),max {L(y, z˜, z) : y ∈ GY , y ≤ y˜}+ ε} .
The parameter ε ensures the strict monotonicity of the empirical counterpart.
(3) For each y ∈ GY invert L to obtain:
Lˆ−(F1(y|z)|z, z˜) = sup
{
y˜ : L∗ε(y˜, z˜, z) ≤ Fˆ1(y|z)
}
(4) Bootstrap Lˆ−(F1(y|z)|z, z˜) to obtain the covariance matrix of estimator evaluated at each (y, z, z˜) ∈ GY ×
GX × GY . With this, calculate a uniform (in y and z) critical value of level α for the test:
H0 : inf {z˜ ≥ z : L−(F1(y|z)|z, z˜) ≤ 0}
using the methodology of Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013), applying the Adaptive Inequality selection.
In practice, considering all values of y ∈ GY results in many redundant inequalities and decreases the power
of the test. We consider a subset of GY for the computation of the critical value. Invert the test to obtain
a one sided confidence interval for L−(F1(y|z)|z)).
(5) The one sided confidence interval for C(y, z) follows immediately.
Inference for the upper bound is similar, adapting steps (2) to (4).
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